EXCISE 1063



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INQUIRE=DOC18D
ITEM NO=00603162
ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX878  MCN = 92225/38434  TOR = 922252314
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9812 2252317-CCCC--RUEALGX.
ZNY CCCCC
HEADER
O 122317Z AUG 92
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEOACC/CDRPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//AORC-POG-SB//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 122308Z AUG 92
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2152
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/DIRONDCP WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 5501
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0028
RUEHNA/DEAHQS WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 3047
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2/POLAD/SCJ3-DDD//
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3224
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0486
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2491
BT
CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LA PAZ 012835

DEPT FOR ARA/AND, INM, PM AND H

NSC FOR BEERS

ONDCP FOR PORTER

DOD FOR ISA

USIA FOR AR

DEA FOR OC AND OF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
TAGS: PREL, MASS, SNAR, PGOV, PINR, BL
SUBJECT: GOB REACTION TO LEAKED CRANSTON LETTER

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY
(X) EXCISE (X) DECLASSIFY IN PART
( ) DENY
( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions B1 B6
PA Exemptions
IS/FPC/CDR Amy Date: 5/26/95
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
TS authority to:

2. SUMMARY: THE LEAKED AUGUST 7 LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT TO SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON REGARDING USG MILITARY COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA (PREDICTABLY) STIRRED UP A POLITICAL AND MEDIA FIRESTORM. WITH SENATE INTERPELLATION OF THREE CABINET MINISTERS EXPECTED THE WEEK OF AUGUST 17, A WORRIED GOB IS SCRAMBLING TO PUT OUT THE FIRE. WE HAVE TRIED TO HELP, EMPHASIZING THAT THE LETTER IS NOT A POLICY STATEMENT, THAT USG MILITARY CN ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA WAS FULLY AND OPENLY NEGOTIATED AND THAT NEITHER BOLIVIA NOR THE U.S. IS FORCING ITS WILL ON THE OTHER. WE ALSO URGED THE GOB TO TAKE ON ITS POLITICAL AND MEDIA OPPONENTS WHO WERE USING THE LETTER AS AMMUNITION. LATE ON AUGUST 10, THE MFA ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE WHICH TRIED TO SEPARATE PRESIDENT PAZ ZAMORA FROM THE ISSUE AND WHICH EMPHASIZED THAT USG CN MILITARY ASSISTANCE EVOLVED OVER TIME. THE COMMUNIQUE AND SUBSEQUENT GOB SPIN CONTROL SEEMS TO HAVE DEFUSED THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS, BUT THE GOB STILL HAS TO LEARN TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR, AND NOT LET THE MEDIA CONTROL, ITS POLICIES. END SUMMARY.

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A LESS-THAN-HELPFUL LEAK

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3. THE LEAKED AUGUST 7 LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT TO SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON REGARDING USG MILITARY COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA (PREDICTABLY) STIRRED UP A POLITICAL FIRESTORM. THE OPPOSITION, SCENTING BLOOD, SEIZED ON THE LETTER'S ASSERTION THAT PRESIDENT JAIME PAZ ZAMORA REQUESTED U.S. MILITARY CN ASSISTANCE IN 1990. THE MEDIA HAS HAD A FIELD DAY SPLASHING STORIES AND BANNER HEADLINES OVER THE FRONT PAGES (SEPTEL). WITH SENATE INTERPELLATION OF THE MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERIOR EXPECTED THE WEEK OF AUGUST 17, A WORRIED GOB IS SCRAMBLING TO PUT OUT THE FIRE. IN THE DCM'S SEPARATE CALLS ON ACTING FONMIN MANFREDO KEMPFF (FONMIN RONALD MACLEAN WAS IN QUITO FOR DURAN'S INAUGURATION), SUBSECRETARY FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS HUMBERTO BOHRT, VISITING AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON JORGE CRESPO AND MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY GUSTAVO FERNANDEZ ON AUGUST 10, WE TRIED TO HELP.

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WE URGE THE GOB TO START BALING

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4. THE DCM PROVIDED A COPY OF THE MULLENS-CRANSTON LETTER TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS (CRESPO RECEIVED A COPY BY FAX FROM

WASHINGTON ONLY MINUTES AFTER THE DCM ARRIVED), BRIEFLY EXPLAINED THE CONGRESSIONAL REPLY PROCESS AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE LETTER WAS NOT A "STATEMENT" BY ARA ARONSON, AS THE BOLIVIAN MEDIA HAD MISTAKENLY REPORTED; IT WAS AN INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL REPLY TO ONE SENATOR'S QUESTIONS. THE LETTER THEREFORE WAS A REPLY TO CRANSTON, NOT A FORMAL POLICY STATEMENT TO THE GOB;

-- ALTHOUGH POORLY TIMED, GIVEN THE ON-GOING POLITICAL CONTROVERSY OVER THE ROLE/PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN BOLIVIA AND THE QUANTITY/DISTRIBUTION OF USG MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE LETTER ,WAS NOT PART OF A DELIBERATE ANTI-GOB "CONSPIRACY." IT WAS SENT TO MEET SENATOR CRANSTON'S CONFIRMATION HEARING DEADLINE;

-- THE MEDIA WAS USING THE LETTER TO STIR CONTROVERSY (IN FACT, THE AUGUST 10 HEADLINES WERE BLATANTLY

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
CONTRADICTORY; SOME SAID THE USG HAD "PRESSURED" THE GOB TO ACCEPT MILITARY ASSISTANCE; OTHERS SAID PAZ ZAMORA HAD REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE). THE LETTER HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN LEAKED FOR PRECISELY THIS PURPOSE (IT WAS SENT AUGUST 7 AND APPEARED IN THE BOLIVIAN PRESS AUGUST 9);

-- THE GOB SHOULD NOT LET THE MEDIA DRIVE POLICY IN THIS WAY.

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AND

-- NEITHER THE USG NOR THE GOB WAS "FORCING ITS WILL" OR "IMPOSING" ON THE OTHER. MILITARY CN ASSISTANCE WAS NOT A NEW ISSUE; IT HAD BEEN JOINTLY AGREED TO BY PRESIDENTS PAZ ZAMORA AND BUSH AT CARTAGENA IN 1990, OPENLY AND FULLY

NEGOTIATED AND COORDINATED EACH YEAR SINCE, AND WAS FULLY IN KEEPING WITH OUR OVERALL BILATERAL OBJECTIVES, AS EMPHASIZED BY THE AMBASSADOR IN HIS PUBLIC MESSAGE ON BOLIVIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY (SEPTEL).

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MFA CORRECTS HISTORY, EXPLAINS LEAK, PLANS JOINT STATEMENT

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5. CRESPO, WHO EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS AN EYEWITNESS TO THE CARTAGENA TALKS, SAID THERE WAS NO REQUEST BY THE GOB FOR USG MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN 1990 AND CERTAINLY NO SPECIFIC GOB REQUEST FOR THE BOLIVIAN ARMY TO "ENTER" THE DRUG WAR, AS THE PRESS REPORTS OF THE CRANSTON LETTER ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMED. (THE BOLIVIAN REPORTS INCLUDED SLOPPY TRANSLATIONS WHICH CONFUSED "MILITARY" ASSISTANCE/PARTICIPATION WITH "ARMY" ASSISTANCE/PARTICIPATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE LETTER ITSELF DID NOT MAKE THIS DISTINCTION CRYSTAL CLEAR). CRESPO STRESSED THAT SECRETARY BAKER HAD HELPED CRAFT THE LANGUAGE THAT PERMITTED BOLIVIAN ARMY PARTICIPATION ONLY WHEN THE PRESIDENT OF BOLIVIA JUDGED IT NECESSARY.

6. CRESPO ALSO ASSERTED THAT [ B6

[ ACCORDING TO CRESPO, THIS APPARENTLY [ B6 ] PERMITTED THE QUICK LEAK AND PUBLICATION OF THE MULLENS-CRANSTON LETTER. [ B1

7. [

KEMPFF AND CRESPO SAID THE GOB WAS CONSIDERING ISSUING A JOINT STATEMENT WITH US TO "CLARIFY" THE LETTER. THE STATEMENT WOULD BE USED AT A LATE AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 10. CRESPO ALSO SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH PAZ ZAMORA (AT HIS RANCH IN TARIJA) ABOUT THE ISSUE. KEMPFF EXPLAINED THAT UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS, THE GOB WOULD NOT MAKE AN ISSUE OF LEAKS LIKE THE MULLENS-

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
CRANSTON LETTER; WITH THE SENATE CLAMORING FOR A MINISTER'S HEAD OR TWO IN THE INTERPELLATION, HOWEVER, THE GOB HAD TO REPLY.

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MINPRES WELCOMES COORDINATION; PAZ ZAMORA NOT WORRIED

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8. FERNANDEZ WELCOMED THE DCM'S VISIT AND HAD ALREADY

CONSU TED THE PRESIDENT. THE DCM RAISED THE SAME POINTS HE HAD COVERED WITH KEMPFF, CRESPO AND BOHRT, ADDING THAT THE INCONSISTENT MEDIA COVERAGE (AND GOB HANDLING) OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ISSUE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY TROUBLING THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY. FERNANDEZ AGREED.

9. FERNANDEZ'S MESSAGE FROM PAZ ZAMORA WAS:

-- THE PRESIDENT IS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LEAK OF THE LETTER, BUT HE WANTS THE GOB "CAREFULLY" TO COORDINATE A JOINT RESPONSE WITH THE EMBASSY;

-- THE CN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ISSUE SHOULD BE SEPARATED, IF POSSIBLE, FROM THE MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ISSUE; AND

-- THE PRESIDENT HAD REQUESTED MORE USG MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN 1990, THEN ACCEPTED CN CONDITIONS ON THAT ASSISTANCE, AS LONG AS HE HAD THE FINAL SAY ON USE OF THE ARMY (A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT, AND PROBABLY MORE ACCURATE VERSION THAN CRESPO'S OF WHAT TRANSPIRED AT CARTAGENA).

FERNANDEZ AGREED WITH KEMPFF AND CRESPO THAT A JOINT USG-GOB STATEMENT WOULD BE THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. FERNANDEZ SAID HE WOULD AGAIN CALL THE PRESIDENT, ADDING THAT THE GOB WOULD GET BACK TO US LATER IN THE DAY BEFORE THE SCHEDULED PRESS CONFERENCE.

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ON SECOND THOUGHT, GOB HAS COLD FEET

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10. LATER, HAVING CONSIDERED THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE LEAKED LETTER MORE FULLY, THE GOB BACKPEDALLED AND REQUESTED THAT THE EMBASSY ISSUE A SEPARATE "CLARIFYING" STATEMENT. THE GOB, THROUGH THE MFA, WOULD ISSUE ITS OWN STATEMENT AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE (SCHEDULED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DCM'S LAST VISIT OF THE DAY, GIVING US LITTLE TIME TO REACT).

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11. AMENDING HIS EARLIER ACCOUNT, CRESPO ARGUED THAT THE USG HAD PRESSURED THE GOB TO ACCEPT MILITARY CN ASSISTANCE (AND AN ARMY ROLE) BY THREATENING TO WITHOLD ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. (AT A RECEPTION ON AUGUST 10, GOB OFFICIALS INCLUDING GENERALLY PRO-U.S FINANCE MINISTER JORGE QUIROGA MADE THE SAME POINT.)

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GOB STATEMENT AND SPIN CONTROL: NOT ALL BAD

12. THE MFA'S STATEMENT (SEPTEL) AND PRESS CONFERENCE, HANDLED BY KEMPFF AND BOHRT, LARGELY FOLLOWED THEIR SCRIPT. KEMPFF EMPHASIZED THAT THE CURRENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORMULA HAD "EVOLVED" SINCE CARTAGENA AND THAT PAZ ZAMORA HAD NEVER PERSONALLY REQUESTED ASSISTANCE TO THE ARMY; THE REQUEST WAS "GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT." BOHRT NOTED THAT CN-DEDICATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS ALL THE U.S OFFERED; THE GOB HAD TO ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS OR

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
NOT RECEIVE THE AID. KEMPFF ADDED THAT THE DIRECT "INTERVENTION" OF THE ARMY IN THE DRUG WAR WAS AN OPTION, NOT A REQUIREMENT, IN THE USG-GOB BILATERAL CN AGREEMENTS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL POLICE DID NOT NEED THE ARMY'S DIRECT SUPPORT, HE CONCLUDED.

13. BACKED UP BY ADDITIONAL SPIN CONTROL ON AUGUST 12 FROM FERNANDEZ (WHO DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY "MILITARIZATION" OF THE DRUG WAR UNDER THE PAZ ZAMORA ADMINISTRATION, EMPHASIZED THE GOOD GOB-USG RELATIONS AND SUGGESTED THAT OPPOSITION JEALOUSY OF PAZ ZAMORA'S INTERNATIONAL SUCCESSES MOTIVATED THE CRANSTON LETTER CONTROVERSY) AND FROM INTERIOR MINISTER CARLOS SAAVEDRA, WHO ALSO EMPHASIZED THE CLOSE USG-GOB CN COOPERATION, THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS SEEMED TO DIE DOWN. THE ARMY HAS NOT GIVEN UP, HOWEVER. ARMED FORCES CINC GENERAL OSCAR VARGAS TOLD THE MEDIA AUGUST 12 THAT ARMY PARTICIPATION IN THE DRUG WAR, ALTHOUGH NOT REQUIRED, WAS NECESSARY. HE ADDED THAT THE ARMY PREFERRED THE 1990 AND 1991 ANNEXES TO THE CN AGREEMENT (WHICH PROVIDED THE ARMY MORE ASSISTANCE).

OUR STRATEGY: LET GOB HANDLE THE PROBLEM

14. ALTHOUGH KEMPFF ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE EMBASSY WOULD ISSUE ITS OWN "CLARIFICATION," WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO AN ENDLESS (AND POINTLESS) ROUND OF REBUTTALS WITH THE BOLIVIAN MEDIA. INSTEAD, OUR GOALS ARE TO KEEP A LOWER PROFILE, DEFLECT ATTENTION BACK TO THE GOB (WHICH MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS ACTIONS) AND BURY THE MEDIA WITH THE FACTS. WE HAVE PROVIDED THE GOB A DETAILED FACT SHEET ON THE SUCCESSES OF OPERATION "GHOST ZONE," WHICH INTERIOR SUBSECRETARY FOR SOCIAL DEFENSE GONZALO TORRICO PLANS TO ISSUE AS A PRESS RELEASE. WE HAVE ALSO SENT, TO KEY MEDIA, POLITICAL AND GOB OFFICIALS, A PACKAGE OF 1987-1991 THE CN AGREEMENTS AND ANNEXES WHICH EXPLAIN OUR CN ASSISTANCE, MILITARY AND OTHERWISE. (POLITICALLY GUN SHY,

THE GOB HAS NOT MADE THESE PUBLIC; WE CONSIDER THEM TO BE OPEN, GOOD FAITH AGREEMENTS.)

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